1. First, describe a biological engineering application or tool you want to develop and why. This could be inspired by an idea for your HTGAA class project and/or something for which you are already doing in your research, or something you are just curious about.

   Ans) Recently while scrolling on Instagram I saw this reel about how the first malicious DNA sample was made, how someone encoded a malicious code into a strand of DNA which hacked into the computer running the genomic sequence. Imagine someday biology would evolve such that DNA cannot be read or sequenced because it attacks the computers reading it. But since I am already into cyber security, something related to this seems like the perfect blend of my interests and this course. So I can work on red teaming which is basically when someone attacks a system for testing its security like imagine making “virus” viruses which are actual viruses which infect computer systems sequencing them or blue teaming when someone evaluates the safety of a system to find weak points and suggest fixes like making “antiviruses” which eliminate the “virus” viruses and protect a system.

   Although all this is very far fetched right now, it might be possible in the future someday as we have almost reached the limit of silicon, researches are trying to make bio-computers using DNA and proteins and this course itself has talked about logic gates using proteins and logic gates are the building blocks of computers. Scientists have also tried and succeeded to store digital data inside DNA so what I mean to say is if not right now someday we will probably have biological computers and at that point “viruses” might be very literal.

2. Next, describe one or more governance/policy goals related to ensuring that this application or tool contributes to an "ethical" future, like ensuring non-malfeasance (preventing harm). Break big goals down into two or more specific sub-goals. Below is one example framework (developed in the context of synthetic genomics) you can choose to use or adapt, or you can develop your own. The example was developed to consider policy goals of ensuring safety and security, alongside other goals, like promoting constructive uses, but you could propose other goals for example, those relating to equity or autonomy.

   Ans) I believe nothing exists of this sort yet and hence there are no policies or goals to ensure that this application or tool contributes to an “ethical” cause directly but there are many measures in place to limit the sale of DNA synthesizers, regulations like the Hague ethical guidelines promotes use of chemistry and related fields responsibly. Regulations like GINA in the United States aim to protect genetic information and prevent its misuse

3. Next, describe at least three different potential governance "actions" by considering the four aspects below (Purpose, Design, Assumptions, Risks of Failure & “Success”). Try to outline a mix of actions (e.g. a new requirement/rule, incentive, or technical strategy) pursued by different "actors" (e.g. academic researchers, companies, federal regulators, law enforcement, etc). Draw upon your existing knowledge and a little additional digging, and feel free to use analogies to other domains (e.g. 3D printing, drones, financial systems, etc.).

   • Purpose: What is done now and what changes are you proposing?

   • Design: What is needed to make it “work”? (including the actor(s) involved - who must opt-in, fund, approve, or implement, etc)

   • Assumptions: What could you have wrong (incorrect assumptions, uncertainties)?

   • Risks of Failure & “Success”: How might this fail, including any unintended consequences of the “success” of your proposed actions?

     Ans)

     Purpose	Design	Assumptions	Risks of Failure & Success
     1. Enhance Sequence Screening Regulations

     Current: DNA synthesizer companies may voluntarily screen orders for hazardous sequences, but practices vary and are not uniformly enforced. Proposal: Mandate advanced, continuously updated screening protocols to detect sequences with potential dual-use risks (e.g., those that could encode malicious payloads targeting bio-cyber systems).* | Actors Involved: Federal regulators (e.g., FDA/NIH), international oversight bodies, and DNA synthesizer companies. Implementation: Develop standardized software algorithms (akin to antivirus databases) for sequence screening. Require companies to implement these as part of the synthesis process and submit to periodic audits. | - It is assumed that malicious sequence “signatures” can be reliably identified and that screening algorithms can be updated fast enough to counter emerging threats.

     • Assumes companies will have the technical capacity and willingness to implement and maintain such systems. | - Failure: Overly rigid screening might generate false positives, hindering legitimate research or innovation. Conversely, if the screening is too lax, novel malicious sequences may slip through.
     • Success: If successful, the action could significantly reduce the risk of a bio-cyber attack but might also prompt an ongoing adversarial “arms race” between malicious actors and screening technology developers. | | 2. Institutionalize Mandatory Red Teaming and Cyber-Bio Security Audits

     Current: Bioinformatics and sequencing labs may perform ad-hoc security assessments. No universal standard exists for simulating attacks on biological sequencing systems or bio-computers. Proposal: Require institutions that operate systems capable of reading or processing DNA (especially those approaching “bio-computing” complexity) to conduct regular red teaming exercises that simulate bio-cyber attacks (e.g., malicious DNA injections) to identify vulnerabilities.* | Actors Involved: Research institutions, private companies in the bioinformatics sector, third-party security firms, and oversight agencies (possibly under a national cyber-bio security authority). Implementation: Develop guidelines and standardized testing protocols. Institutions would contract certified red teams to carry out simulated attacks, report findings, and mandate remediation plans. | • Assumes that red teaming exercises can realistically mimic potential bio-cyber threats and that institutions have or can acquire the necessary expertise. • Assumes transparency in sharing vulnerabilities will not be exploited by adversaries. | - Failure: Inadequate testing protocols might miss critical vulnerabilities or, worse, accidental release of malicious sequences during simulations might occur.

     • Success: While enhancing overall system security, mandatory red teaming could increase operational costs and administrative burdens. There is also a risk that overregulation might push some research underground, where oversight is minimal. | | 3. Establish an International Cooperative Framework for Dual-Use Bioengineering Current: Oversight of dual-use research is fragmented across national borders, with some countries having stringent controls and others less so. Proposal: Create an international treaty or collaborative body (modeled in part on frameworks like the Biological Weapons Convention) to coordinate best practices, share intelligence on emerging threats, and enforce ethical standards in bioengineering that has potential cyber-bio applications.* | Actors Involved: National governments, international organizations (e.g., WHO, Interpol, or a new dedicated body), academic consortia, and industry representatives. Implementation: Develop an agreed-upon set of standards and reporting protocols for dual-use research. Countries would commit to periodic reviews, mutual inspections, and coordinated responses to incidents (including mandatory incident reporting and joint red teaming exercises across borders). | • Assumes that nations and major research stakeholders can reach a consensus on definitions of “dual use” and acceptable risk thresholds. • Assumes that sharing sensitive information on vulnerabilities does not jeopardize national security or proprietary interests. | - Failure: Political disagreements or differing national interests could lead to non-compliance, uneven enforcement, or even drive risky research underground. Overregulation might slow scientific progress.
     • Success: A robust international framework could prevent misuse and enhance rapid global response to emerging threats; however, its success depends on sustained international cooperation and sufficient resources for oversight and enforcement. |

4. Next, score (from 1-3 with, 1 as the best, or n/a) each of your governance actions against your rubric of policy goals. The following is one framework but feel free to make your own:

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Ans) HW1 Q4

1. Last, drawing upon this scoring, describe which governance option, or combination of options, you would prioritize, and why. Outline any trade-offs you considered as well as assumptions and uncertainties. For this, you can choose one or more relevant audiences for your recommendation, which could range from the very local (e.g. to MIT leadership or Cambridge Mayoral Office) to the national (e.g. to President Biden or the head of a Federal Agency) to the international (e.g. to the United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, or the leadership of a multinational firm or industry consortia). These could also be one of the “actor” groups in your matrix.

   Ans) I would prioritize a hybrid approach combining Enhanced Sequence Screening Regulations and Mandatory Red Teaming & Cyber-Bio Security Audits, with elements of International Cooperation for long-term governance. Strengthening DNA synthesis regulations ensures that malicious bio-code cannot be easily created, while red teaming allows researchers to simulate attacks and identify vulnerabilities before they become real threats. This balances prevention and response while keeping costs manageable.

   However, strict regulations could slow down research, so industry participation is key. Private biotech firms and research institutions should be encouraged to self-regulate, with government oversight ensuring compliance. Over time, global cooperation will be necessary to create standardized security protocols, but immediate action should focus on national policies and industry best practices.

   Federal agencies like NIH, DARPA, and NSF should mandate security measures for funded research, while international bodies like the UN and WHO can help define global norms. Since bio-cyber threats are still emerging, a phased approach—starting with national regulations and moving towards global cooperation—ensures that security does not come at the cost of scientific progress.